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“Our Artillery Would Smash It All Up”
Canadian Artillery During the Battle of the 
Somme, September-November 1916 
B R E N D A N  H O G A N
Abstract : The historiography of the First World War has produced 
no recent comprehensive study of the Canadian artillery, despite its 
importance on the battlefield. This article seeks to explain how Canadian 
artillery evolved on the Somme. The central conclusions of this article are 
that the Canadian artillery’s performance during the battle was mixed, 
and that a number of technological, tactical, and organizational changes, 
not all of them Canadian, in the Canadian Corps that we recognize from 
the artillery of 1917-1918 were developed during, or as a result of, the 
Somme.
Describing the disastrous attack on Regina Trench on 25 October 1916, Private J. Robinson of the 44th (Manitoba) Battalion 
Canadian Expeditionary Force (cef) noted:
[W]e were supposed to go over [the top] in the morning and we were 
told that this trench, we were told that our artillery would smash it all 
up and we got going over the top in the morning and there was nothing, 
you see, and they start falling around me like wheat and I lay in a shell 
hole all of one day with another fellow…. We got about 150 yards or 
so and the guys were dropping all around us. So we crawled into this 
trench and another guy crawled in and you know that by seven o’clock 
there was seven of us in there. They were wounded. They all died except 
he and I and he was wounded and we laid there all day with our nose 
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right to the ground and every time one of them jumped up to run back 
he’d be sniped and we lost about half the battalion.1
Evidently, the artillery supporting the 44th Battalion’s attack failed 
to provide effective fire support. The guns did not clear gaps in the 
barbed wire, neutralize German defensive strongpoints, or knock 
out German guns, so the infantry had to advance under withering 
machine gun and artillery fire. Consequently, no 44th Battalion 
soldiers even reached the German wire. However, not all battles 
during the Somme offensive (July–November 1916) transpired like 
the 44th Battalion’s failed attack on Regina Trench. In a number of 
engagements, the artillery managed to provide effective fire support 
during the pre-battle bombardment, which cleared paths through 
the German wire obstacles, neutralized defensive strongpoints, 
and attempted to silence enemy guns. To cover the advance of the 
infantry, they fired piled up2 and later creeping barrages and engaged 
targets in German rear areas to disrupt enemy communications, 
reinforcement, and resupply. While the Canadian infantrymen 
cleared the remaining Germans out of their trenches and dugouts, 
the gunners shot sos missions to break up the inevitable German 
counterattacks and afford the infantry time to consolidate its new 
positions.
Although the Somme features prominently in British literature 
on the First World War, Canada’s role on the Somme remains largely 
unaddressed in the historiography.3 This is unfortunate because the 
Somme was the second longest and second-most costly campaign 
fought by the Canadian Corps during the war.4 The 2nd Canadian 
1  J. Robinson, 44th Battalion, Vol. 13, Record Group (hereafter RG) 41, Library 
and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC); for a detailed description of the battle, see 
William Stewart, “When the Learning Curve Falls: The Ordeal of the 44th Battalion, 
25 October 1916,” British Journal of Military History 20, 3 (July 2016): 24-46.
2  Piled up barrages suppressed German defences by saturating the main defensive 
line with shellfire, thereby forcing German soldiers to seek shelter in their dugouts.
3  Amongst the best overviews of the Somme are A.H. Farrar-Hockley, The Somme 
(London: B.T. Batsford Ltd, 1964); Gary Sheffield, The Somme: A New History 
(London: Cassell Military Paperbacks, 2003); Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, 
The Somme (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2005); Peter Hart, 
The Somme: The Darkest Hour on the Western Front (New York: Pegasus Books, 
2008); and William Philpott, Three Armies on the Somme: The First Battle of the 
Twentieth Century (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009).
4  The 4th Canadian Division spent most of its time on the Somme fighting with II 
Corps and only served briefly with the Canadian Corps. 
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Division performed much better on the Somme than it had during the 
fiasco at St. Eloi (17 March–16 April 1916). Its attack on Courcelette 
(15 September 1916) succeeded largely due to good staff work, 
training, rehearsals, and artillery preparations. The gunners shot an 
effective creeping barrage, and British tanks fought alongside the 
infantry for the first time. However, as the brutal actions at Thiepval 
Ridge (end-September) and the Ancre Heights (October-November) 
attest, Canadian commanders and staff, under pressure from their 
British superiors, continued to order assaults on German trenches and 
defensive strongpoints, often without adequate planning or sufficient 
artillery support. There were no easy battles in the First World War. 
Fighting incurred heavy casualties. However, commanders and staffs 
learned from these battles, especially during the Somme offensive. 
They disseminated these lessons across the British Expeditionary 
Force (bef), the Canadian Corps included, and applied them during 
subsequent battles in 1917 and 1918. Although David Campbell, Tim 
Cook, Andrew McEwen, and Bill Rawling have made some significant 
contributions to our understanding of Canadian soldiers and their role 
during the offensive, many questions pertaining to artillery remain to 
be considered.5 Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson’s The Gunners of Canada: 
The History of the Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery, Volume 
I, 1534-1919 provides a thorough overview of Canada’s artillery, 
including the artillery’s experience on the Somme, but it is generally 
5  David Campbell, “A Forgotten Victory: Courcelette, 15 September 1916,” Canadian 
Military Journal 16, 2 (Spring 2007): 27-48; Tim Cook, At the Sharp End: Canadians 
Fighting the Great War, 1914-1916, Volume One (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2007); 
Andrew McEwen, “‘A Useful Accessory to the Infantry, but Nothing More:’ Tanks 
at the Battle of Flers-Courcelette, September 1916,” Canadian Military History 20, 4 
(Autumn 2011):7-22; and Bill Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare: Technology in the 
Canadian Corps, 1914-1918 (Toronto, Buffalo and London: University of Toronto 
Press, 1992). 
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descriptive rather than analytical.6 This article seeks to fill at least 
part of that gap in the historiography of the Canadian Corps and the 
First World War by explaining how Canadian artillery fought and 
evolved on the Somme.
During the First World War, the artillery conquered and the 
infantry occupied, as the saying goes, but the worn-out aphorism 
does not accurately describe how the two arms worked together on 
the battlefield. While the artillery did provide the necessary fire 
support to overcome the inherent strength of the defence, the infantry 
still had much fighting to do. German defenders who survived the 
artillery bombardments had to be cleared out of their dugouts and 
trenches with grenades and bayonets. The infantry did not win 
the battle on its own, but neither did the artillery. The 1909 Field 
Service Regulations (FSRs) state, “The function of the artillery is 
to assist the other arms [infantry and cavalry] in breaking down 
hostile opposition.”7 Furthermore, the FSRs clearly delineate the 
requirement for cooperation between the infantry and the artillery. 
“The object of artillery fire is to help the infantry to maintain its 
mobility and offensive power…. The artillery fire must be distributed 
according to requirements on all objectives from which effective fire 
is brought to bear on the attacking infantry.”8 Major Alan F. Brooke, 
later the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (cigs) and titled Lord 
Alanbrooke, understood the relationship between the artillery and 
infantry.9 He aptly noted, “Operations can no doubt be carried out 
successfully with a deficiency of fire power, but only at the cost of 
6  G.W.L. Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada: The History of the Royal Regiment of 
Canadian Artillery, Volume I, 1534-1919 (Toronto and Montreal: McClelland and 
Stewart Limited, 1967). The history of the Royal Regiment of Artillery during the 
First World War has been addressed by numerous scholars. Notable amongst them 
are: Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, Fire-Power: British Army Weapons 
and Theories of War, 1904-1945 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military Classics, 1982); 
Sir Martin Farndale, History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery: Western Front 1914-
18 (London: Royal Artillery Institution, 1986); Jonathon Bailey, “British Artillery 
in the Great War,” in ed. Paddy Griffith, British Fighting Methods in the Great War 
(London and Portland: Frank Cass, 1996); William Sanders Marble, “‘The Infantry 
cannot do with a gun less’: the place of the artillery in the BEF, 1914-1918” (PhD 
diss., King’s College London, 1998). 
7  War Office, Field Service Regulations, Part I, Operations (London: His Majesty’s 
Stationary Office, 1912), 15.
8  Ibid, 135-36. 
9  Brooke also served as staff officer to the general officer commanding Royal Artillery 
of the Canadian Corps from February 1917 until May 1918. 
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exceptionally heavy casualties.”10 The heavy casualties sustained 
during the Battle of the Somme certainly validated Brooke’s claim.
During the Battle of the Somme, the Canadian artillery was 
organized like the rest of the artillery in the bef. The smallest unit, 
a battery, was composed of four guns, either the 18-pounder or the 
4.5-inch howitzer and commanded by a major. Three 18-pounder 
batteries, one 4.5-inch howitzer battery, and a headquarters section 
made up a field artillery brigade led by a lieutenant-colonel. The 
divisional artillery, directed by the commander Royal Artillery 
(cra) – a brigadier-general, consisted of the headquarters, divisional 
ammunition column, and the four mixed field artillery brigades. These 
divisional artilleries could be grouped together and used to support 
the corps’ operations, if required. The general officer commanding 
Royal Artillery (goc ra)—a major-general— controlled the guns 
at the corps level. The organization of the heavy artillery changed 
a number of times during the course of the war and, during the 
10  Lieutenant-Colonel A.F. Brooke (later Alanbrooke), “Evolution of Artillery in 
the Great War, 1914-1918,” ALANBROOKE 3/10, Liddell Hart Centre of Military 
Archives (hereafter LHCMA), 470.
A heavy howitzer on the Somme. [Library and Archives Canada PA-000848]
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Battle of the Somme, there was an almost 100 per cent increase in 
the number of heavy artillery pieces in the Canadian Corps. The 
Canadians inherited the heavy guns from the 1st anzac Corps when 
they relieved the Australians, but most of the batteries were British, 
with a few Australian and Canadian batteries thrown in.11 During 
the battle, the heavy artillery guns were grouped into batteries of 
four guns, which in turn were grouped into heavy artillery groups 
(hags) composed of a number of heavy and siege gun batteries and 
commanded by a lieutenant-colonel. The commander heavy artillery 
(cha)—a brigadier general—wielded a number of hags at the corps 
level. The heavy artillery consisted of the 60-pounder and 4.7-inch 
guns. All other large artillery pieces, from the 6-inch howitzers and 
guns up to the 15-inch howitzers, were classified as siege artillery. 
On the Somme, British gunners lacked effective point-detonating 
fuzes for their shells. The insensitive fuzes used by the gunners on 
11  War Diary (hereafter WD) Canadian Corps General Staff, 11 September 1916, 
File 7, Vol. 90, RG9-III-D-3, LAC.
One of the roads to Baupame. [Library and Archives Canada PA-000884]
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their high explosive (he) rounds often failed to detonate on contact 
with the wire obstacles or the ground. Usually, the he shell buried 
itself a few feet into the soft mud before detonating, which inflicted 
little to no damage on the wire obstacles and cratered the battlefield.12 
Although gunners first used small quantities of the reliable point-
detonating No. 106 Fuze in November 1916, it was not until 1917 
that its use was widespread. The No. 106 Fuze greatly improved 
the efficiency of he shells against defensive strongpoints and barbed 
wire.13 On the Somme, shrapnel was the shell of choice for wire 
cutting. To be effective, the timed fuze on the shrapnel shell had to 
be set to burst the shell close to the ground just in front of the wire. If 
the fuze setting was too short or too long, the shrapnel balls would do 
little damage to the wire obstacles. This haphazard process worked 
only 30 to 40 per cent of the time.14 Gas shells were also used on the 
Somme, principally to harass German gunners at nighttime.15
At the Chantilly conference in December 1915, General Joseph 
Joffre, Commander-in-Chief of French forces on the Western Front, 
proposed that the British and French armies launch a massive 
combined offensive on the Somme sector, where the two armies met, 
in coordination with offensives launched by the Russians and the 
Italians on the Eastern and Isonzo fronts, respectively. General Sir 
Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the bef, initially wanted the 
offensive to be launched in Flanders, but he agreed to Joffre’s proposal 
because the French would provide the majority of the troops for the 
attack.16 However, the Germans preempted the Allied offensive with 
their own attack against Verdun in February 1916. The French army 
had sustained enormous casualties, between February and June, 
defending and trying to recapture lost ground and could no longer 
provide the bulk of the troops for the Somme offensive.17 The British 
needed to attack to relieve some of the pressure on the embattled 
French army. With twenty-nine British and eight French divisions, 
12  Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare, 71. 
13  Brooke, “Evolution of Artillery in the Great War, 1914-1918,” 43, 46.
14  Artillery Notes No. 5, Wire Cutting, June 1916, Stationery Service (SS) / Central 
Distribution Sections (CDS) Pamphlets Collection 98/5, Imperial War Museum.
15  For a thorough overview of the Canadian Corps’ experience with gas warfare, see 
Tim Cook, No Place to Run: The Canadian Corps and Gas Warfare in the First 
World War (Vancouver and Toronto: UBC Press, 2009).
16  Philpott, Three Armies on the Somme, 71-72.
17  Ibid, 11-12. 
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Haig intended to breach the German defences and exploit the 
breakthrough with cavalry.18 However, General Sir Henry Rawlinson, 
commander of the Fourth Army that was the principal attacking 
formation for the British, did not believe that breakthroughs were 
possible and favoured a slow, grinding battle of attrition based on 
limited objectives.19 But there were disagreements about subsequent 
stages of the battle. In the initial assault, both men agreed that, to 
avoid repeating the mistakes of the 1915 battles, which were launched 
on narrow fronts and easily contained by the Germans, that the 
attack had to be conducted on a broad front—and heavily supported 
by artillery.
The artillery had five principal tasks: saturating the infantry’s 
objective with fire to neutralize and suppress enemy emplacements, 
clearing gaps in the German barbed wire, targeting flanking defensive 
positions to prevent enfilading fire, interdicting enemy reinforcements 
and counterattacks, and conducting counter-battery shoots to suppress 
the German guns.20 Before the infantrymen began their attack, the 
artillery fired a pre-battle bombardment. Bombardments required 
enormous amounts of ammunition, and gunners fired the majority 
of their shells during these types of fire missions. The bombardment 
was a vital task that preceded the barrages because the infantry 
depended on it to neutralize the German defences and to clear gaps in 
the barbed wire. While the gunners used their larger pieces to destroy 
the German defensive positions, they used their trench mortars and 
18-pounders to blow gaps in the wire with shrapnel.21 To provide 
cover for the advancing infantry, the artillery fired piled up and, later, 
creeping barrages. Unlike the piled up barrages that only saturated 
the main defensive line with fire, the creeping barrages also suppressed 
German soldiers deployed in depth from their trenches, which the 
Germans started to do on 2 July 1916. It also had the added benefits 
of blinding enemy observation of the attacking troops and providing 
18  Although an Allied operation, the French were not under Haig’s command and 
operated independently from the BEF for the duration of the Battle of the Somme. 
For an examination of Haig’s concept of operations for the Battle of the Somme, see 
Gary Sheffield, The Chief: Douglas Haig and the British Army (London: Aurum, 
2011), 165-69. 
19  For an overview of Rawlinson’s planning for 1 July, see Robin Prior and Trevor 
Wilson, Command on the Western Front: The Military Career of Sir Henry 
Rawlinson, 1914-1918 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military Classics, 2004), 138-70. 
20  Brooke, “Evolution of Artillery in the Great War, 1914-1918,” 266. 
21  Bailey, “British Artillery in the Great War,” 32.
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a guide for the advancing infantry. At the conclusion of a barrage, 
the guns dwelled in front of the infantry’s objectives to allow them 
to consolidate by hampering German efforts to assemble their troops 
for counterattack.22 When the Germans did launch counterattacks, 
the Canadian infantrymen would launch flares to call for a sos fire. 
Although ammunition intensive and inhibiting to deeper advance, 
sos fire assisted the Canadian infantry with defeating the German 
counterattacks. Finally, the artillery conducted some counter-battery 
shoots during the Battle of the Somme, although they were rarely a 
priority, and the results were often disappointing.
Before the guns could commence bombardments and barrages, 
however, they needed to be registered. Registration refers to the 
process whereby, firing the guns and observing the fall of shot, the 
necessary corrections to charge, elevation, and traverse could be 
made to compensate for the total effects of non-standard conditions 
(weather, equipment, ammunition, and survey errors). Preferably, a 
forward observation officer (foo) would find a suitable vantage point 
that afforded him good observation to observe the fall of shot for the 
guns that he was tasked to register. Registration made the artillery 
more accurate, but it also signaled to the Germans that an attack was 
about to commence. If observation from the ground was not possible, 
aerial spotting provided by the Royal Flying Corps (rfc) could be 
used to register the guns. Major W.A. “Billy” Bishop, Canada’s most 
famous ace of the First World War, described the process of aerial 
observation—in this particular instance a counter-battery shoot—in 
his wartime memoir Winged Warfare.23 
You fly on until you pick up the four mounds that indicate the German 
battery position. You fly rather low to get a good look at it. The Huns 
generally know what your coming means and take cover. You return a 
little way toward your own lines and signal to your battery to fire. In a 
moment you see the flash of a big gun. Then nothing seems to happen 
for an eternity. As a matter of fact twenty to thirty seconds elapse 
and then fifty yards beyond the German battery you see a spurt of 
grey-black earth spring from the ground. You signal a correction of the 
range. The next shot goes fifty yards short. In artillery language you 
22  Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power, 112.
23  William A. Bishop, Winged Warfare (New York: George H. Doran Company, 
1918). 
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have “bracketed” your target. You again signal a correction, giving a 
range just in between the first two shots. The next shell that goes over 
explodes in a gunpit.24
However, aerial observation aircraft could not observe the fall of shot 
in bad weather or fog, and they were extremely vulnerable to enemy 
anti-aircraft fire. This is why many battles during the First World 
War were predicated on gaining observation from higher points of 
ground over the enemy’s lines, or denying the same to the enemy. 
To support the attack on 1 July 1916, the Fourth Army had over 
1,300 guns along its fifteen-mile front, which seems impressive, but it 
was not enough for the task at hand. Concentrated on just the front 
line, these 1,300 guns might have been sufficient to neutralize the 
German defences, but having to engage multiple defensive lines in 
depth meant that the artillery fire was too dispersed to accomplish all 
five artillery tasks, either simultaneously or in rapid succession, even 
if that was not clear to the attackers at the time. During the battle, 
British and Canadian gunners struggled to blow gaps in German 
barbed wire. During any assault, numerous breaches had to be made 
in the dense German wire obstacles, lest the assaulting infantry fall 
behind the barrage and have to fight their way through the German 
defences without any fire support. Destroying wire required enormous 
amounts of shells. In June 1916, iii Corps staff officers determined 
that it would take, on average, 70,000 shells to clear all of the wire 
between the division’s start line and final objective.25 Even if all of 
these shells were supplied, the divisional artillery staffs of the 8th, 
19th (Western), and 34th Divisions, which were attached to iii Corps 
in the summer of 1916, did not predict favourable results.26 They were 
right. Patrols sent into no man’s land in advance of the 1 July assault 
confirmed that the intense seven-day preparatory bombardment had 
left the German wire largely intact and defensive positions unscathed.
General Headquarters (ghq) and Fourth Army headquarters 
went ahead with the assault because they believed, incorrectly as 
it turned out, that they had enough guns and other support for a 
successful assault. The Battle of the Somme, like most First World 
24  Ibid, 27-28. 
25  Report on Visit to III Corps, June 1916, appended to WD of the Heavy Artillery 
V Corps, June 1916, WO 95/757, Public Records Office, Kew.
26  Ibid. 
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War offensives, was a firepower-intensive operation, and, on 1 July, 
it opened in a symphony of explosives.27 From the air, shells rained 
down on the German positions at a rate of 3,500 each minute. 
Simultaneously, the Royal Engineers detonated a series of mines, 
under the German trenches, that they had dug and packed with 
explosives. Confident of success, Rawlinson decreed that “nothing 
could exist at the conclusion of the bombardment in the area covered 
by it.”28 Unfortunately for the British infantrymen, most of the German 
defenders took shelter in their well-constructed dugouts where they 
remained during the bombardment, emerging unscathed to man their 
crew-served weapons and slaughter the attacking British. On the first 
day of the battle alone, the British army sustained 57,470 casualties.29 
To date, 1 July 1916 remains the costliest day in the history of the 
British army.
Although the bombardment on 1 July failed to provide effective 
fire support in most sectors, in some divisions, innovative commanders 
and staff officers had prepared artillery instructions that enabled 
the infantry to cross no man’s land and capture its objectives. The 
British formations closer to the French sector also fared better than 
the divisions attacking to the north due in part to what they learned 
about gunnery techniques and procedures from the French.30 For 
instance, Major-General Ivor Maxse’s 18th (Eastern) Division used 
the creeping barrage to great effect on 1 July and secured all of its 
objectives.31 Major Alan F. Brooke, Brigade-Major Royal Artillery, 
prepared the fire plan for the 18th Division’s attack by adapting 
techniques he had learned from the French artillery fighting at 
Verdun.32 The manner by which Brooke issued his orders greatly 
contributed to the success of his artillery programme. He noted, “My 
method of issuing orders in the form of barrage maps was sufficiently 
perfected by then for me to issue barrage maps at the rate of one 
per battery showing the lane of fire of each battery, the successive 
27  The intensive pre-battle bombardment had begun on 24 June 1916. 
28  Quoted in G.W.L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919: Official 
History of the Canadian Army in the First World War (Montreal, Kingston, London, 
and Chicago: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015), 168. 
29  Philpott, Three Armies on the Somme, 10.
30  Ibid, 173-79. 
31  Birch’s Report on the Somme Bombardment, 9 July 1916, Rawlins Papers, 12A, 
Royal Artillery Institution (hereafter RAI). 
32  Paul Strong and Sanders Marble, Artillery in the Great War (Barnsley: Pen & 
Sword Military, 2011), 93.
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lifts of fire, and the timings of lifts with their rates of fire.”33 Brooke 
described the successful attack of the 18th Division on 1 July, which 
“ran like clock-work, every objective being gained on the Divisional 
front. We had advanced 1,500 yards on a 2,000 yard front…we had 
counted over 1,000 dead Germans … and had captured some 600 
[prisoners] and taken much equipment and about a dozen guns.”34 
Instead of attempting to knock out German machine-gun positions, 
the creeping barrage suppressed the German defenders, while the 
infantry crossed no man’s land. Lieutenant-Colonel Neil Fraser-
Tytler, a British artillery officer, described the creeping barrage:
Just before Zero Hour everybody comes up to the Switch Trench. It 
makes a splendid grandstand; as the batteries have already all the 
endless lift and alterations of range, we at the op [observation post] 
are simply spectators. I have seen many of these zero hours, and they 
get more stupendous each time. Often there is a lull during the last 
33  Field Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke, “Notes on My Life,” ALANBROOKE 5/2/13, 
LHCMA, 54.
34  Ibid. 
Battle of Courcelette Barrage Map, 15 September 1916. [Appended to War Diary GOC RA 
Canadian Corps, September 1916. Library and Archives Canada, RG9-III-D-3 Vol. 4958, File 505.]
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five minutes; then at the appointed second the whole world seems to 
explode. It is impossible to exaggerate what Hunland looks like on these 
occasions, erupting as it were in one vast volcano! The endless Hun 
sos rockets ascend and down comes a Hun counter-barrage, followed 
by a period in which there is nothing to be seen except whirls of flame-
stabbed smoke, incendiary shells bursting, and more rockets.35
Creeping barrages allowed the infantry to advance across no man’s 
land, but they did not win the battle. Despite Brooke’s positive 
assessment of the division’s performance on 1 July, the 18th Division 
still sustained approximately 30 per cent casualties capturing its 
objectives.36
The need for enormous amounts of ordnance to launch successful 
offensives necessitated major changes to the organization and 
command of artillery. Divisions did not possess sufficient firepower 
from their own artillery brigades to conduct operations alone, so they 
required the guns of other divisions and higher formations.37 During 
the Battle of the Somme, the Canadian Corps, like other corps in the 
bef, pooled its divisional artilleries and assigned them to the control 
of Brigadier-General H.E. Burstall, goc ra of the Canadian Corps, 
to be employed as he saw fit. Consequently, the divisional artilleries 
rarely supported their own divisions. For instance, the 2nd Canadian 
Divisional Artillery (cDa) never supported the 2nd Canadian 
Division during the Battle of the Somme. Even after the Canadian 
Corps, minus the 4th Canadian Division, left the Somme sector for 
Vimy in October 1916, the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd CDAs remained on 
the Somme and supported the operations of ii Corps.38 The need for 
clear command and control of the guns became painfully apparent 
after the bombardment of the first day of the offensive failed to 
provide effective fire support. On 29 July, Major-General Sir Noel 
Birch, the Major-General Royal Artillery (mgra) of ghq, noted, “It 
is high time that the ‘bogey’ dual control [between the general staff 
35  Neil Fraser-Tytler, Field Guns in France (London: Hutchison, 1922), 115.
36  Strong and Marble, Artillery in the Great War, 93.
37  Artillery Lessons Drawn from the Battle of the Somme, December 1916, 
MONTGOMERY-MASSINGBERD 7/3-4, LHCMA. 
38  Besides the need for additional pieces to support operations, moving guns, 
headquarters, and ammunition columns was a laborious task, to say nothing of 
the survey, bedding in, etc. that would have to be completed to occupy new gun 
positions. 
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and the artillery] was knocked on the head. The Artillery Command 
throughout requires strengthening to prevent dual control in action, 
and to ensure rapid and efficient concentration of fire, efficient co-
operation with aeroplanes, etc.”39 At all formation levels in the bef, 
the role of the artillery commander evolved during the war. Instead of 
merely acting as an advisor to the divisional commander on artillery 
39  Letter from Birch to Lieutenant-General Sir L.E. Kiggell, chief of staff BEF, 29 
July 1916, Letters from Major-General Birch, June-July 1916, Uniacke Papers, U/
III/13, RAI. 
Major-General Sir H. E. Burstall by Sir William Orpen. [National Gallery of Canada]
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matters, the cra, the senior gunner at the divisional level, became a 
commander in his own right to the same degree as the commanders 
of the infantry brigades in the division.40
During set-piece operations, like the Somme, the corps, specifically 
the goc ra and his staff, played an instrumental role in the planning 
and execution of the artillery programs.41 Before the war, the corps 
only had an artillery advisor serving on the staff. However, the need 
for centralized control of the guns prompted the creation of two 
artillery commander positions in the corps headquarters: the goc 
ra, later named brigadier-general Royal Artillery (bgra), and the 
cha. Similar to the cra, the goc ra was responsible for “the co-
ordination of the action of the artillery of the corps, and the executive 
command of such portions of it as the corps commander might direct 
from time to time.”42 The cha had similar duties with respect to 
the corps’ heavy guns.43 At the army level, the mgra advised the 
army commander on artillery matters, issued fire plans to corps 
headquarters for large offensives conducted by the army, coordinated 
the efforts of the army and corps artillery units, and liaised with the 
rfc to ensure cooperation between the artillery and air units.44 Before 
the Somme offensive, Major-General Sir C.E.D. Budworth, mgra of 
the Fourth Army, issued the first army-wide artillery instruction, 
which established the priorities of fire for the corps and divisional 
artillery staffs.45 Centralization of command and control of artillery 
fire greatly reduced confusion and ensured more efficient use of guns 
and ammunition.
The Canadian Corps joined the Battle of the Somme in the 
period that Haig later described in his dispatches as “the wearing-out 
battle.”46 On 19 August, Haig announced that he intended to renew 
40  Brooke, “Evolution of Artillery in the Great War, 1914-1918,” 378. 
41  Bailey, “British Artillery in the Great War,”44-45.
42  Letter from Birch to Kiggell, 8 June 1916, Letters from Major-General Birch, 
June-July 1916, Uniacke Papers, U/III/13, RAI; and Brooke, “Evolution of Artillery 
in the Great War, 1914-1918,” 378.
43  Report on Visit to III Corps, June 1916.
44  Brooke, “Evolution of Artillery in the Great War, 1914-1918,” 379; and Letter 
from Birch to Kiggell, 29 July 1916. 
45  Strong and Marble, Artillery in the Great War, 90.
46  Haig viewed the entire Somme offensive as a large attritional battle that was a 
necessary precursor to eventual victory. Lieutenant-Colonel J.H. Boraston, ed., Sir 
Douglas Haig’s Despatches, December 1915-April 1919 (London and Toronto: J.M. 
Dent & Sons Ltd., 1919), 19-59. 
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the offensive in mid-September with “fresh forces and all available 
resources.”47 Initially, only the 1st and 2nd cDas and the heavy 
artillery served on the Somme. The 3rd cDa did not arrive until 
early October, and the 4th cDa was still forming in England. The 
1st cDa arrived in the Somme sector in late August from the Ypres 
salient and immediately commenced preparations for the upcoming 
offensive.48 The 2nd cDa followed and arrived on 8 September.49 
To prepare for the offensive, the gunners registered their guns, 
established observation posts, and dug gun pits to protect themselves 
from German shellfire.50
For its role during the Battle of Flers-Courcelette, the Canadian 
Corps received orders to attack with two divisions on a 2,200-yard 
front to capture the German defensive positions in front of the village 
of Courcelette. Lieutenant-General Sir Julian Byng, commander of 
the Canadian Corps, ordered Major-General Richard Turner’s 2nd 
Canadian Division, on the right flank, to secure the secure the German 
defensive positions, and Major-General Louis Lipsett’s 3rd Canadian 
47  Quoted in Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919, 165. 
48  WD 1st CDA, 28 August 1916, File 507, Vol. 4958, RG9-III-D-3, LAC.
49  WD 2nd CDA, 10 September 1916, File 510, Vol. 4959, RG9-III-D-3, LAC.
50  WD 2nd Brigade Canadian Field Artillery, 6 September 1916, File 529, Vol. 4965, 
RG9-III-D-3, LAC.
[G.W.L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919]
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Division, attacking on the left flank, to provide flank security.51 General 
Sir Hubert Gough’s Reserve Army, of which the Canadian Corps was 
a part, needed to capture these features to protect the left flank of 
the Fourth Army.52 Burstall, commander of the corps artillery, and 
his staff prepared a sophisticated, yet effective, artillery instruction 
to support the attack on Courcelette. Burstall assembled 234 field 
guns and sixty-four heavy pieces to support the attack.53 British and 
Indian divisional artillery, including Brooke’s 18th Division, supplied 
many of these guns, and it was the largest concentration of guns to 
support an operation conducted by the Canadian Corps to that point 
in the war.54 An intense five-day bombardment preceded the battle. 
For example, the artillery instruction called for every 10 yards of 
German trench to be saturated with fifteen rounds of heavy, twenty 
rounds of medium, and forty-five rounds of 4.5-inch howitzer shells 
during the two days 13 and 14 September.55
Positioned nearly wheel-to- wheel in valleys south of Pozières, 
the Canadian gunners suffered grievously from the German counter-
battery shoots but continued to fire shell after shell into the German 
positions.56 Sergeant Reginald Grant, a gun detachment commander, 
noted, “I had the firm conviction that death would come when it 
would come and not till then, and I went about my work absolutely 
careless of any possible hurt.”57 Lieutenant J.M. Walton, an artillery 
officer wrote, “We have the preponderance in artillery and everything 
else, in fact, and we give them twenty shells to their one. How they 
live through our terrific bombardments is a wonder to me.”58 The 
Canadians were also fortunate that their positions atop Pozières ridge 
afforded them an unobstructed view of the German defences, which 
51  Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919, 169.
52  Campbell, “A Forgotten Victory,” 29.
53  Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada, 261-62. 
54  H.M. Jackson, The Royal Regiment of Artillery, Ottawa, 1855-1952: A History 
(Montreal: Industrial School for the Deaf, 1952), 108; and Nicholson, The Gunners 
of Canada, 262. 
55  Artillery Instructions No. 25 by GOC RA Canadian Corps, 12 September 1916, 
appended to WD GOC RA Canadian Corps, September 1916, File 503, Vol. 4957, 
RG9-III-D-3, LAC.
56  Cook, At the Sharp End, 441. 
57  Quoted in Ibid.
58  Charles Lyons Foster and William S. Duthie, eds., Letters from the Front: Being 
a Record of the Role Played by Officers of the Bank in the Great War, 1914-1919 
(Toronto and Montreal: Southam Press Limited, 1920), 172. 
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“show up beautifully in the chalk soil.”59 This enabled the Canadians 
to register their guns without having to rely heavily on the rfc. 
Burstall ordered his 18-pounders to fire shrapnel shells at zero-
hour, 50 yards in front of the German trenches.60 The fire plan 
dictated that each gun fire four rounds for the first minute, before 
the fire would be adjusted to target the first German trench line for 
three minutes. To continue providing the advancing infantry with 
fire support, each gun fired two rounds per minute, and the barrage 
moved forward 100 yards every three minutes, until the infantry 
reached their final objective—a depth of 1,000 yards. Once the 
infantrymen reached their final objective, the gun fire dwelled on 
line forward of the consolidating soldiers and returned to the original 
rate of fire for six minutes. This formed a protective barrier several 
hundred metres in front of the infantry’s final objectives. The heavier 
guns, which belonged to Brigadier-General A.C. Currie’s corps heavy 
artillery and which had already bombarded the German defences for 
three days, continued to bombard the German trenches to suppress 
them while the infantry advanced.61 Once the creeping barrage fired 
by the 18-pounders got within 500 yards of the bombardment, the 
heavy guns adjusted their fire to targets further in the German 
rear and dwelled on them until the creeping barrage got within 
500 yards again and so on. Not all of the artillery assigned to the 
corps participated in the creeping barrage. A number of batteries 
were “superimposed,” meaning their fires could be brought to bear 
on contingency targets.62 For instance, the 10th Field Battery, 3rd 
Brigade Canadian Field Artillery (cfa), received orders to “engage 
targets of opportunity reported by the r.f.c.,” which it did on 
numerous occasions throughout the battle.63
The attack on 15 September got off to a successful start, largely 
because of sound artillery preparation. At 0620, the creeping barrage 
started 50 metres in front of the German trenches to knock out 
59  WD 1st Brigade Canadian Field Artillery (CFA), 31 August 1916, File 527, Vol. 
4964, RG9-III-D-3, LAC. 
60  Operation Order No. 26 by GOC RA Canadian Corps, 13 September 1916, 
appended to WD GOC RA Canadian Corps, September 1916.
61  Ibid.
62  Bailey, “British Artillery in the Great War,” 33.
63  Quoted in R. James Steel, The Battery: The History of the 10th (St. Catherines) 
Field Battery, Royal Canadian Artillery (St. Catherines: 10th Field Battery 
Association, 1996), 88. 
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advance outposts and forced the Germans to seek cover in their 
dugouts. Brooke described the effects of the bombardment. “Along 
the Pozières Ridge … the surface is literally ploughed up by shell, not 
a square foot anywhere that has not been churned up. Everything 
broken and smashed, not a tree, bush or house left. A scene of absolute 
desolation and destruction. Broken debris everywhere.”64 That effect 
was the result of extremely tough work on the gun line:
The gunners back in their rough splinter-proof gun pits had become 
temporarily stone deaf, while blood oozed from their ears and noses. 
Orders were passed in writing; the noise was too terrific for words. 
Field gun batteries were firing four rounds per minute, ceasing for a 
few seconds to lift the range as the barrage crept forward in front of 
our infantry.65
Not everything ran like clockwork. At 0623, the barrage lifted 
and the Canadians began their assault. However, the infantry had 
not reached the German trenches when the barrage lifted 90 metres 
forward, so the Canadian infantry had to fight the remaining 100 
yards forward under heavy German machine-gun fire. They would 
never have made it that far without the well-executed barrage, 
and they did make it to their objectives, more or less intact.66 The 
thorough planning and preparations for the attack paid off. Within 
ten minutes of zero-hour, all of the battalions in the 2nd Canadian 
Division secured their first objectives.
After the battalions had secured their final objectives, Byng, 
under pressure from Gough, ordered his divisional commanders 
to exploit their successes and execute a follow-on attack to secure 
Courcelette and the Fabeck Graben.67 This was a new operation 
and only ordered late in the morning. Gough had explicitly ruled it 
out during the pre-battle planning, and Haig only ordered it late at 
night on 14 September.68 That British and Canadian gunners were 
able to put together effective bombardments and barrages in such 
tight time constraints speaks to their flexibility and proficiency. At 
64  Alanbrooke, “Notes on My Life,” 56.
65  Quoted in Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada, 265.
66  Cook, At the Sharp End, 449. 
67  WD Canadian Corps General Staff, 15 September 1916. 
68  Ibid, 14 September 1916. 
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1800 on 15 September, the guns commenced firing another creeping 
barrage to cover the attack by the 22nd (French Canadian) and 25th 
(Nova Scotia Rifles) Battalions to capture the village of Courcelette.69 
Although the creeping barrage suppressed German machine-gun fire, 
most enemy guns, largely unmolested by Anglo-Canadian counter-
battery fire, remained in action throughout the battle and inflicted 
significant casualties upon the advancing infantry, although not 
enough to halt their attack. An after-action report written by the 
commanding officer of the 25th Battalion noted, “As we started 
our advance we came under artillery fire almost immediately but 
this did not in the slightest degree check or confuse our men. They 
marched that distance of 2200 yards as though they were on a 
General Inspection Parade.”70 In a few instances, Canadian gunners 
working with the rfc pinpointed the location of German batteries 
and neutralized them before the infantry attack began.71 But it was 
69  Cook, At the Sharp End, 459. 
70  Lieutenant-Colonel E. Williams’ Report on the 25th Battalion’s Capture of 
Courcelette, 25 September 1916, appended to WD 25th Battalion, September 1916, 
File 417, Vol. 4933, RG9-III-D-3, LAC.
71  Jackson, The Royal Regiment of Artillery, Ottawa, 1855-1952, 108.
Courcelette being shelled during attack by Canadians. [Library and Archives Canada PA-000807]
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the rapid and deep advance of the Canadian infantry, not the counter-
battery shoot, that silenced the German guns, which had to move 
further to the rear because the Canadian assaulters were getting too 
close.
The Battle of Flers-Courcelette was a much needed victory 
for the bef. Along the 6-mile attack front, British and Canadian 
soldiers advanced approximately 1 mile.72 In his dispatches, Haig 
cheerfully reported, “The result of the fighting on the 15th September 
and following days was a gain more considerable than any which 
had attended our arms in the course of a single operation since the 
commencement of the offensive.”73 The week’s fighting to seize and 
hold Courcelette cost the Canadian Corps 7,230 casualties.
Still, no breakthrough had been achieved, so Gough ordered Byng’s 
Canadian Corps and the British ii Corps to seize Thiepval Ridge, a 
gentle slope a few hundred yards past Courcelette, and the gunners 
got back to work. After the Battle of Courcelette, preparations began 
immediately to build the infrastructure to move the guns forward. 
Sergeant J.A. Brice wrote in a letter home, “As quickly as a few 
hundred yards’ advance is made, big working parties make new roads 
(and good ones, too), all running in the one direction. Before the road 
is half-done the guns have been brought up to new positions and the 
stream of ammunition wagons soon becomes unbroken.”74 Over 800 
guns and mortars were moved forward and assembled to support the 
attacks on Thiepval Ridge by the Canadian and British ii Corps on 
26 September.75 By 24 September, the gunners had occupied their 
new positions and began registering their guns in preparation for 
the attack to seize Thiepval Ridge.76 To soften the German defences 
before the attack began, the artillery fired gas shells and conducted 
numerous harassing fire shoots.77 Lieutenant Allen Oliver, a foo for the 
26th Field Battery, wrote “the general idea seems to be to get revenge 
on the enemy for the five months pounding which he gave us in the 
[Ypres] salient.”78 At 1235 on 26 September, the artillery commenced 
its barrage. While the heavy guns concentrated on destroying the 
72  Boraston, ed., Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatches, 42.
73  Ibid.
74  Foster and Duthie, eds., Letters from the Front, 166.
75  Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919, 176.
76  WD 1st CDA, 24 September 1916; and WD 2nd CDA, 24 September 1916. 
77  WD 1st CDA, 23 September 1916. 
78  Quoted in Cook, At the Sharp End, 472.
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German trenches, the field artillery laid down a blanket of shrapnel 
for the infantry of the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions to advance 
behind.79 Although the barrage suppressed the front-line trenches, the 
Germans sited many of their machine guns in craters in no man’s 
land, so the bombardment left them unscathed. These machine 
guns, sited with enfilading fields of fire, inflicted heavy casualties 
on the advancing troops.80 The attack continued for two days, and 
79  Artillery Instructions No. 32 by by GOC RA Canadian Corps, 24 September 1916, 
appended to WD GOC RA Canadian Corps, September 1916. 
80  WD 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade, 26 September 1916, File 220, Vol. 4876, RG9-
III-D-3, LAC; and Brigadier-General H.D.B. Ketchen’s Report on operations from 
the 24th to 28th September, 30 September 1916, appended to WD 6th Canadian 
Infantry Brigade, September 1916, File 263, Vol. 4888, RG9-III-D-3, LAC. 
Fire Plan for the Attack on Thiepval Ridge, 24  September 1916. [Appended to War Diary 2nd 
Canadian Divisional Artillery, September 1916. Library and Archives Canada RG9-III-D-3, Vol 4959, 
File 510.]
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the infantry did secure Zollern and Hessian Trenches; however, after 
repeated attempts, they were “unable to make a lodgment” in Regina 
Trench.81 The effectiveness of artillery support during the Battle of 
the Somme was far from uniform.
Incessant fighting and bef artillery bombardments and barrages 
forced the Germans to adjust their defensive doctrine. A German 
government official noted, “The unprecedented English artillery fire 
on the Somme is filling the hospitals more than ever, all those on the 
Rhine being over-filled, so that the wounded are being transported 
straight from the Western Front to the Tempelhofer Hospital in 
Berlin.”82 Realizing that filling the frontline trenches with troops 
only provided the Allied gunners with good targets, the Germans 
evolved their defensive doctrine to avoid cramming men into forward 
trenches by employing an elastic defence system.83 They dug their 
main defensive positions on reverse slopes, where Allied artillery 
observers could not see them. Only a few troops held the frontline 
trenches. Most were held in reserve for counterattacks to regain any 
lost ground after the Allied attack began to stall. Additionally, the 
Germans sited their machine guns away from their trenches and had 
their artillery register defensive fire targets.
German readjustments to their defences made attacking difficult 
and costly. During the battles to seize Regina Trench on 1 and 
8 October, the British and Canadian artillery could neither clear 
gaps in the German wire obstacles nor could they neutralize enemy 
machine guns. German wire remained largely intact because, as 
discussed earlier, shrapnel was not very effective for this task, with 
deadly consequences. The 18-pounders from the 1st Canadian, 2nd 
Canadian, and Lahore Divisional Artilleries bombarded the German 
wire with shrapnel for more than a week in advance of the 8 October 
attack, for example, but the wire obstacles remained intact. German 
machine guns were difficult to neutralize because they were so 
difficult to locate. The Germans built the Regina Trench position 
on the reverse slop of a spur on Thiepval Ridge, making it difficult 
for FOOs to observe fire and necessitating aerial observation, which 
was hampered by the poor weather conditions. A corps intelligence 
report compiled immediately after the 1 October assault, indicated 
81  WD 1st CDA, 29 September 1916.
82  Quoted in Strong and Marble, Artillery in the Great War, 97.
83  Ibid, 95.
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that while Regina Trench was “considerably damaged in parts by our 
Artillery, it is still very strong.”84 Strong it was. Defensive positions 
with wire obstacles that can hold attackers up, machine gunners who 
can see their targets, and guns that can fire on registered targets will 
always be able to inflict damage on anyone who tries to attack them. 
The Canadians suffered 962 casualties on 1 October and still failed 
to capture Regina Trench.85 Canon Frederick Scott, senior chaplain 
of the 1st Canadian Division, recalled one horrific incident: “One 
man told me that he had counted three hundred bodies hanging on 
the wire which we had failed to cut in preparation for the attack.”86 
The attack on 8 October by 1st and 3rd Canadian Divisions piled up 
84  Intelligence Report on Regina Trench, 4 October 1916, appended to WD Canadian 
Corps General Staff, October 1916.
85  Brigadier-General J.H. Elmsley’s Report on Operations from September 27th to 
October 3rd, 1916, appended to WD 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade, October 1916, 
File 287, Vol. 4895, RG9-III-D-3, LAC. 
86  Canon Frederick George Scott, The Great War as I Saw It (Toronto: F.D. 
Goodchild Company, 1922), 139.
Junction of Regina and Kenora trenches. [Library and Archives Canada C-014151]
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another 1,364 casualties, and still failed to force the Germans from 
the position.87 Major Agar Adamson, acting commanding officer of 
the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, observed:
The Army had become too sanguine and gave us [7th Canadian Infantry 
Brigade] a job that was almost impossible to carry out and did not give 
us enough support and in many cases, though not in ours, the Artillery 
had not cut the wire, the men being shot to pieces trying to get through 
it…. The r.c.r. [Royal Canadian Regiment] lost every officer, killed, 
wounded, or taken prisoner, they sent in, except the c.o. and Adjutant.88
Attacks could not go on like this.
To combat the new German defensive doctrine, British and 
Canadian gunners now had to fire on a far greater depth than before, 
even if this diluted the concentration of fire across the entire front. 
The artillery needed to target shell holes in no man’s land that the 
Germans converted into machine gun nests and the rear areas where 
the guns were and where the Germans would likely form-up to launch 
counterattacks.89 The 21 October attack by 4th Major General David 
Watson’s 4th Canadian Division, as part of Lieutenant-General Sir 
Claude Jacob’s ii Corps incorporated many of the artillery lessons 
learned during the difficult battles of September and early October. 
The Canadian Corps had left the Somme on 17 October for Vimy 
Ridge, but nearly all of its artillery remained behind in support of the 
ongoing operations.90 Supplied with an enormous quantity of shells, 
the gunners supporting the ii Corps attack received orders to blast 
Regina Trench. The order stated, “No limit to number of rounds fired 
on each spot, except that each section of trench must be completely 
obliterated.”91 The gunners did that. After firing over tens of thousands 
of he shells at Regina Trench, they literally erased it from the map.92 
87  Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919, 186.
88  Norm Christie, ed., Letters of Agar Adamson, 1914 to 1919: Lieutenant-Colonel, 
Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (Nepean: CEF Books, 1997), 223.
89  Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power, 112; and Artillery Lessons Drawn from the 
Battle of the Somme. 
90  The three CDAs remained in II Corps when the Canadian Corps left for Vimy on 
17 October. They did not return until late in November. Nicholson, The Gunners 
of Canada, 272. 
91  Artillery Instructions No. 42 by GOC RA Canadian Corps, 10 October 1916, 
appended to WD GOC RA Canadian Corps, October 1916.
92  Ibid, 515.
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They also prevented the Germans from repairing their damaged 
defences by continually shelling the German wire obstacles.93 Once 
the assault started, machine guns joined in the barrage and fired 
over 500,000 bullets over the heads of the infantry to disrupt the 
movement of reinforcements and break up German counterattacks.94 
The fire support provided for the attack by Brigadier-General Victor 
Odlum’s 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade on 21 October proved 
effective. Within three hours, the brigade had secured a portion of 
the trench, repulsed a number of German counterattacks with the 
help of sos fire, and captured 160 prisoners while sustaining 468 
casualties.95 That is how it worked when there was sufficient time 
to find and register targets and sufficient ammunition to cut wire, 
destroy enemy defences, neutralize enemy weapons and break up 
enemy counterattacks.
Rushed operations rarely turned out well, as Watson found 
out a few days later. Seeking to replicate Odlum’s success, Watson 
ordered Brigadier-General William St. Pierre Hughes, commander 
of the 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade and brother of the infamous 
Minister of Militia Sir Sam Hughes, to direct his 44th Battalion to 
capture the remainder of Regina Trench on 25 October. However, the 
German defenders remained resolute and the artillery fire support 
was ragged. A foo from the 10th Brigade cfa recollected the barrage 
was “absolutely insufficient to keep down enemy machine-gun fire, 
there being not enough guns on the zone and the rate of fire was too 
slow.”96 St. Pierre Hughes later informed Sir George Perley, Minister 
of Overseas Military Forces, that the guns took too long to deploy 
forward and most had to fire without registering.97 Hughes’s point was 
a valid one. Rain had turned the battlefield into a bog and hindered 
mobility. To continue supporting the advance of the infantry, the 
gunners needed to deploy their guns in forward positions. However, the 
deep mud made finding a suitable gun position nearly impossible. As 
93  Reserve Army Orders & Instructions S.G. 20/10/338, 11 October 1916, appended 
to WD Canadian Corps General Staff, October 1916. 
94  Cook, At the Sharp End, 513.
95  Report on operation conducted on the 21st October, 21 October 1916, appended 
to WD 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade, October 1916, File 314, Vol. 4903, RG9-
III-D-3, LAC.
96  Intelligence Report 10th Brigade CFA, 25 October 1916, appended to WD 10th 
Brigade CFA, October 1916, File 549, Vol. 4970, RG9-III-D-3, LAC.
97  Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada, 269.
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Gunner Reginald Grant complained, “Mud under me, water around 
me and hell above me.”98 The gunners often had to manhandle their 
guns into position and ammunition and rations had to be carried 
up to the forward batteries on pack mules and horses.99 Adding to 
their misery, German gunners regularly fired shrapnel and gas shells 
at the Canadian gun positions.100 Making matters worse, in their 
rushed battle preparations, the artillery did not have sufficient time 
to register the guns, which made their fire woefully inaccurate. With 
limited intelligence, the gunners did not target enemy positions on 
the boundaries of the attack, which is where the Germans sited most 
of their machine guns.101 The results should have been predictable. 
At zero-hour on 25 October, the troops of 44th Battalion climbed out 
98  Quoted in Cook, At the Sharp End, 497. 
99  WD 1st CDA, 31 October 1916; and WD 4th Canadian Division, 28 October 1916, 
File 156-157, Vol. 4859, RG9-III-D-3, LAC.
100  Cook, No Place to Run, 85.
101  Intelligence Report 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 26 October 1916, appended 
to WD 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade, October 1916, File 304, Vol. 4901, RG9-
III-D-3, LAC.
Pack horses transporting ammunition to the 20th Battery, Canadian Field Artillery. [LIbrary 
and Archives Canada PA-001231]
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of their trenches and advanced towards Regina Trench. The German 
artillery and machine gunners mowed them down, inflicting over 200 
casualties in a matter of minutes.102
The technical reasons for the ineffectiveness of the artillery fire on 
25 October or any other failed attack did not matter to the infantrymen 
fighting in the trenches, but the reasons were not imagined. Many 
of them dammed the artillery for failing to target the German 
defensive strongpoints and clear gaps in the wire. Lieutenant-Colonel 
W.A. Griesbach, Commanding Officer of the 49th Battalion, wrote, 
“Our field artillery is, in my opinion, quite useless for wire cutting 
and the destruction of the enemy’s works.”103 Unfortunately, he was 
right. Inherent inaccuracies of the guns and instruments, errors by 
the gunners, inconsistencies of the ammunition, and meteorological 
102  WD 44th Canadian Infantry Battalion, 25 October 1916, File 435, Vol. 4939, 
RG9-III-D-3, LAC.
103  Ibid, 502. 
Troops of the Royal Garrison Artillery setting fuses of 6 inch howitzer shells in front of 
Montauban, July 1916.. [© IWM (Q 4035)]
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conditions meant that a shell fired from the same gun with the same 
bearing, fuze setting, and elevation would not land in exactly the 
same spot. This is known as probable error in range and probable 
error in deflection. Together, they form an elongated oval in which 
it can be reasonably assumed that the majority of rounds will burst. 
Barrel wear, inconsistences with ammunition, and human error 
increased the probable error in range and deflection. Less accurate 
fire not only meant that rounds could drop short, it also meant that 
more ammunition was necessary to achieve the same destructive or 
neutralizing effect.
Unreliable fuzes and barrel wear greatly hindered the ability 
of the artillery to accomplish its five tasks. The artillery had the 
means to destroy the German wire—with high explosive—but the 
gunners had no faith in the ordnance. Without the No. 106 fuze, 
he tended to throw wire in the air but not cut it. Consequently, the 
wire would land back on the ground intact, creating a new obstacle, 
but with craters to slow down the already encumbered infantry’s 
advance.104 Despite the pleas of infantry officers to blow gaps in the 
wire, the guns continued to use shrapnel shells against the wire with 
poor results. Furthermore, many of the guns could not fire all of the 
shells supplied to them. After shooting 20,000 rounds the barrel on 
an 18-pounder gun was supposed to be replaced. Shortages of new 
barrels meant that, by the middle of the Somme offensive, most guns 
had already fired between 40,000 to 60,000 rounds without replacing 
the barrels.105 The overuse of the 18-pounders is but one example. 
Canadian gunners appreciated the effect of barrel wear on the 
guns and, on 14 October, the diarist of the Canadian Corps Heavy 
Artillery noted, “unable without putting guns out of action to fire the 
amount of ammunition received.”106 To the detriment of Canadian 
infantrymen, barrel wear greatly affected ballistics by reducing 
obturation and causing rounds to drop short. The consequences of 
short rounds could be great. For instance, the 5th Canadian Infantry 
Brigade sustained a number of casualties due to Canadian shells that 
dropped short. The war diary of the 25th Battalion notes that the 
104  Artillery Notes No. 5, Wire Cutting, June 1916; and Nicholson, The Gunners of 
Canada, 267.
105  Cook, At the Sharp End, 493.
106  WD Canadian Corps Heavy Artillery, 14 October 1916, File 561, Vol. 4973, RG9-
III-D-3, LAC.
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battalion sustained over one hundred casualties to Canadian shellfire 
between 29 and 30 September.107
Without the ability to amend the artillery programme, the infantry 
had to keep pace with the creeping barrage for it to be effective. 
Many FOOs and battery commanders felt utterly helpless once a 
creeping barrage started because they could not alter the timings or 
issue corrections. Artillery staff officers pre-planned barrages, and 
it took hours to modify them. During the attack on Regina Trench 
on 21 October, Captain Henry Hutton Scott of the 87th (Canadian 
Grenadier Guards) Battalion, Frederick Scott’s son, died while leading 
his troops behind a creeping barrage.108 His troops hesitated when a 
machine gun bullet struck him, and they fell behind schedule. When 
another officer finally ordered them to continue advancing, German 
machine guns inflicted heavy casualties on the advancing troops.109 
In instances when the troops kept pace with the barrage, the infantry 
usually managed to secure their objectives quickly and with fewer 
casualties. After-action reports from July and August identified the 
need to mark start-lines as well as sign-post approach routes to avoid 
confusion and delays while crossing no man’s land.110 Barrages also 
had to be fired perpendicular to the direction of the attack to prevent 
the infantry from wandering off course following the barrage. Making 
it easier for the infantry to navigate across no man’s land enabled 
them to keep pace with the barrage.
foos played a critical role in ensuring effective fire support for 
the infantry. By observing the fall of shot, they sought to ensure the 
infantry received effective fire support and that the guns achieved 
good effects on target. Since the Germans sited their trenches 
and wire obstacles on reverse slopes, foos could not observe the 
impact of the shells or provide corrections to the guns to destroy 
or neutralize the German positions. When the target was out of 
sight, the artillery had to rely on aerial observation from the rfc to 
observe their shooting. Being a foo was an incredibly dangerous job. 
In June 1916, ghq issued a note to all artillery units on wire cutting 
and specified, “The observing officer should be as close as possible 
107  WD 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 29-30 September 1916, File 249, Vol. 4884, 
RG9-III-D-3, LAC.
108  Scott, The Great War as I Saw It, 148. 
109  Ibid.
110  Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front, 76.
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to the wire.”111 During the engagements in late October and early 
November, some foos established their observation posts less than 
100 yards away from their targets.112 After receiving the Military 
Cross for bravery in an earlier attempt to capture Regina Trench, 
Lieutenant Allen Oliver was killed while crawling forward through 
the mud and snow to observe the fall of shot on Desire Trench on 18 
November.113 Despite the poor weather conditions and a breakdown 
in communications, the attack of the 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade 
on Desire Trench succeeded with relatively few casualties. Supported 
by all of ii Corps’ heavy guns, the 11th Divisional Artillery, and 
the three CDAs, the creeping barrage allowed the infantry to cross 
no man’s land, make its way through the German wire, and begin 
clearing the remaining Germans out of the trench.114 The brigade 
took 625 Germans prisoner, and some German troops refused to 
launch seemingly futile counterattacks.115
Without communications to ensure fire was applied where 
needed, the potential destructive effect that the artillery could 
inflict was minimized. Abysmal communications meant barrages 
and bombardments had to be preplanned, making the artillery 
inflexible. Consequently, the infantry had to follow the artillery’s 
course. During the Battle of the Somme, the infantry and foos used 
various methods of communication to inform higher headquarters 
and guns of their position. To mark their positions and call for sos 
fire, the standard procedure called for infantrymen to use flares.116 
To prevent the Germans from falsely initiating an sos mission, the 
infantry used different colours of flares that would be specified in the 
operation order.117 Besides flares, signalers also used wire, signaling 
lamps, and runners to communicate. Even at the end of the war, 
the artillery depended upon signalers laying communications wire 
and maintaining it, since wireless communication remained in its 
infancy.118 To maintain communications between the foos, guns, and 
111  Artillery Notes No. 5, Wire Cutting, June 1916. 
112  Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada, 270.
113  Cook, At the Sharp End, 516.
114  Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada, 271. 
115  WD 4th Canadian Division, 18 November 1916. 
116  Report on Visit to III Corps, June 1916.
117  Canadian infantrymen greatly disliked the British flare system because they 
believed that it was cumbersome and prone to failure. 
118  Brooke, “Evolution of Artillery in the Great War, 1914-1918,” 48; Report on Visit 
to III Corps, June 1916; and Artillery Lessons Drawn from the Battle of the Somme.
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headquarters, signalers routinely exposed themselves to enemy fire 
to lay wire and repair it. Sergeant R.B. Gibson, a signaler in the 8th 
Canadian Infantry Brigade, testified to the hazardous nature of their 
job in a 2 November letter:
My job is to see that telephone communication is kept up between the 
front line and brigade headquarters – a job that sounds much easier 
than it actually is. I remember one day in particular we had a stretch 
of line that was rather worse than usual. We had forty-three breaks 
in that small 300 yards in a day, and when anybody went out to fix 
same it was the last we expected to see of him…. I assure you repairing 
lines on that front was hardly what one would call safe. Linemen work 
practically sixteen hours a day and are under the most intense shell-fire 
during that period. But telephone communication had go to be kept up, 
for on it rests the success and co-operation of the whole attack.119
The Somme clearly highlighted the shortcomings with 
communications, and signalers worked tirelessly to develop new 
technology to facilitate the transmission of information. The radios 
and signaling devices they developed improved communication and 
went a long in ensuring fire was brought to bear against the enemy 
where and when it was needed.
Staff officers also played in the effectiveness of the artillery. In 
addition to preparing orders and directing operations, they planned 
and coordinated the forward movement of guns and ammunition, no 
minor task considering the enormous number of guns and shells.120 
Artillery orders and barrage maps needed to be clear and precise so 
that all firing units could adhere to the fire plan. The destructive and 
neutralizing effects these orders called for required massive amounts 
of ammunition, so staffs also had to coordinate the construction 
of roads and railways to keep the guns supplied with shells.121 The 
destruction caused by heavy he shelling coupled with the muddy 
conditions made resupply extremely difficult. The inability to supply 
the guns with the ammunition they needed to prepare the battlefield 
is largely responsible for the delays in attacks in late October 
119  Foster and Duthie, eds., Letters from the Front, 175-76. 
120  Report on Visit to III Corps, June 1916.
121  Artillery Lessons Drawn from the Battle of the Somme.
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and November.122 Furthermore, the aggressive operational tempo 
demanded by Haig and Gough often left insufficient time for the 
staffs to conduct appreciations, draft orders, and coordinate with 
flanking formations. This in turn limited the time available for the 
artillery to prepare for the battle, which nearly always resulted in 
reduced effectiveness.
Artillery commanders and staffs desperately sought better ways 
of fighting. Following the Somme offensive, staff officers across the 
bef studied numerous after-action reports and determined that 
during an initial fire-plan guns had to be controlled at the army and 
corps level.123 Centralizing command of the guns at the corps level, 
like the Canadian Corps did during its time on the Somme, ensured 
a more efficient transmission of orders, which afforded subordinate 
formations and units “ample time to study and work out their tasks in 
detail.”124 The counter-battery offices, which proved vital in knocking 
out German guns in 1917 and 1918, also formed a critical part of the 
corps staffs.125 The emergence of corps artillery staffs was a remarkable 
evolution for an organization that began the war “with no higher 
artillery commander than the c.r.a. of the Division … [who] only 
exercised direct command over his artillery brigades in exceptional 
circumstances.”126 Brooke noted that during the Somme the bef “had 
made great progress in the co-ordinated control of artillery … to 
obtain the massed effect of artillery fire.”127 However, after the initial 
artillery programme had been executed, control over the guns had 
to be devolved down to the divisional level or lower to allow for the 
most effective engagements of targets of opportunity and troublesome 
German defensive strongpoints.128 This devolution of control of the 
guns characterized British operations in the later years of the war. 
122  WD 1st CDA, 24 October 1916; and WD 4th Canadian Division, 28 October 1916
123  Artillery Lessons Drawn from the Battle of the Somme; and Brooke, “Evolution 
of Artillery in the Great War, 1914-1918,” 373. For a thorough examination of the 
necessary role of the corps during the First World War, see Andy Simpson, Directing 
Operations: British Corps Command on the Western Front, 1914-18 (Stroud: 
Spellmount, 2006). 
124  Artillery Lessons Drawn from the Battle of the Somme.
125  For an examination of the development and effectiveness of the Royal Artillery’s 
counter-battery capability, see Albert P. Palazzo, “The British Army’s Counter-
Battery Staff Office and Control of the Enemy in World War I,” Journal of Military 
History Vol. 63, no. 1 (January 1999): 55-74.
126  Brooke, “Evolution of Artillery in the Great War, 1914-1918,” 261. 
127  Alanbrooke, “Notes on My Life,” 57. 
128  Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power, 114-15. 
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For the artillery to provide effective fire support, the fire needed to 
be accurate, the fire plan had to be simple, the rate of movement of 
the creeping barrage had to match the rate of advance of the infantry, 
and the infantry had to advance according to schedule—simple in 
concept, difficult in coordination and execution.129 
Throughout the Battle of the Somme, the effectiveness of the 
artillery continued to be undermined by unreliable point-detonating 
fuzes, inaccurate gun-laying, the impact of deep mud on the deployment 
of guns and ammunition resupply, and the insufficient training in, or 
unfamiliarity with, indirect fire procedures.130 Furthermore, many of 
the 18-pounders had weak recuperator systems, and the shortage of 
gas and smoke shells had not yet been rectified.131 By 1917, gunners in 
the Canadian Corps, and indeed the entire bef, became increasingly 
technically proficient and no longer dismissed the theory of indirect 
fire as “siege gunner fandoodle.”132 To solve the problem of indirect fire, 
they insisted upon “large scale accurate maps … [i]ncreased knowledge 
of survey by artillery personnel, accurate methods of calibration, 
meteorological reports, and systematic sorting of propellants.”133 
Although the War Office issued two pamphlets in December 1915 
and June 1916, both of which noted the haphazard nature of gunnery, 
neither the War Office, ghq, or army headquarters provided explicit 
instruction on calculating the correction of the moment.134 Largely, 
innovative officers serving on corps and divisional staffs—like 
Brooke—deserve the credit for improved gunnery practices.135 Before 
the Battle of Flers-Courcelette began, the cra of the 1st Canadian 
Division, Brigadier-General H.C. Thacker, dispatched this order to 
his brigade commanders: “c.r.a. wishes battery commanders to be 
reminded of the importance of making corrections for temperature 
129  Artillery Lessons Drawn from the Battle of the Somme.
130  Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front, 67; and Rawling, Surviving Trench 
Warfare, 71. 
131  Brooke, “Evolution of Artillery in the Great War, 1914-1918,” 38; and Bidwell 
and Graham, Fire-Power, 111.
132  Quoted in Desmond Morton, When Your Number’s Up: The Canadian Soldier 
in the Great War (Toronto: Vintage Books, 1993), 167; and Nicholson, The Gunners 
of Canada, 273. 
133  Brooke, “Evolution of Artillery in the Great War, 1914-1918,” 372.
134  Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada, 262.
135  Letter from Birch to Kiggell, 29 July 1916; and Nicholson, The Gunners of 
Canada, 262.
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of charge and for general climatic conditions.”136 Although many 
Canadian gunners proudly boasted they led this transformation, 
the adoption of scientific gunnery principles occurred throughout 
the bef.137 To instruct artillery officers in cooperation between the 
artillery and rfc, meteorological work, and the theory of indirect fire, 
the British established the Chapperton Down Artillery School on 30 
136  Message No. 65 from Headquarters 1st Canadian Division Artillery to 
Headquarters 1st Brigade CFA, 14 September 1916, appended to WD 1st Brigade 
CFA, September 1916. 
137  In a speech to the Canadian Club in Hamilton, Major-General Sir E.W.B. 
Morrison, GOC RA of the Canadian Corps, praised the “exceptional” capabilities 
and innovation of Canadian gunners during the war, see Morrison’s Speech at 
Canadian Club in Hamilton, “The Canadian Artillery in the Great War” E.W.B. 
Morrison Papers, File Notes and Pamphlets, Vol. 2, MG 8-E81, LAC. When John 
Swettenham wrote General Andrew McNaughton’s biography, he wrote Alanbrooke 
and others out of the story so that his subject could reap the credit. For instance, he 
attributes the success of the artillery during the Battle of Vimy Ridge to Canadian 
officers, such as Morrison and McNaughton, rather than their British colleagues. 
Since counter-battery was still in its infancy during the Battle of the Somme, no 
specific reference is made to Canadian artillery officers performing better than their 
British counterparts during the battle. John Swettenham, McNaughton, Vol. 1 
(Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1968), 85. 
General Morrison. [Library and Archives Canada PA-002198]
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September 1916.138 By the end of 1916, metrological sections collected 
data and distributed it to all artillery units numerous times daily, 
so they could calculate the correction of the moment.139 Training, 
accurate maps, battery survey, calibration, meteorological reports, 
sorting of propellants, and scientific computation of firing data made 
direct fire much more accurate. Furthermore, predict fire—shooting 
unobserved and unregistered—became practical and somewhat 
accurate for the first time.140 
Although staff officers and gunners identified the need to 
eliminate German guns during the Somme offensive, they lacked the 
technology and expertise.141 By 1915, the engineers began to establish 
observation posts to observe the muzzle flashes of German guns and 
locate them by intersection.142 Similarly, the artillery attempted to 
locate German guns by a primitive method of sound ranging using 
officers equipped with synchronized stop watches at various points 
along the frontline.143 These haphazard methods rarely proved 
effective. The goc ra had to balance the requirement to knock out 
enemy guns through counter-battery shoots with the need for heavy 
guns to carry out bombardment tasks. Since counter-battery was 
still in its infancy and rarely achieved the desired effects, many goc 
RAs preferred tasking the majority of their guns with suppressing 
German defensive positions.144 It was not until 1917 that officers 
specializing in counter-battery had the necessary technology and skill 
to conduct effective counter-battery shoots.145 During the Battle of the 
138  Farndale, History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, 370. 
139  Brooke, “Evolution of Artillery in the Great War, 1914-1918,” 50; and Artillery 
Lessons Drawn from the Battle of the Somme.
140  Marble, “The Infantry cannot do with a gun less,” 91.
141  Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare, 78; Brooke, “Evolution of Artillery in the 
Great War, 1914-1918,” 261; and Artillery Lessons Drawn from the Battle of the 
Somme.
142  Brooke, “Evolution of Artillery in the Great War, 1914-1918,” 49.
143  Ibid. 
144  Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power, 111. 
145  Strong and Marble, Artillery in the Great War, 100. Even in 1917, counter-
battery was still in its infancy, and its claimed effectiveness is at the least suspect. 
High causalities from indirect fire and operational research conducted by No. 2 
Operational Research Section of the 21st Army Group, during the Second World 
War, suggests that most German guns survived British counter-battery shoots and 
remained in action. Terry Copp, ed., Montgomery’s Scientists: Operational Research 
in Northwest Europe The Work of No. 2 Operational Research Section with 21 Army 
Group June 1944 to July 1945 (Waterloo: Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and 
Disarmament Studies, 2000), 295-350.
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Somme, rarely, if ever, did the Canadian artillery silence the enemy 
guns. Almost inevitably, counter-battery missions were assigned to 
neighbouring corps, and they would only fire for a few minutes. For 
instance, during the attack on Thiepval Ridge on 26 September, 
counter-battery was relegated to guns from ii and v Corps.146 As 
a result, German artillery fire was rarely silenced. However, when 
the 4th Canadian Division served in ii Corps, counter-battery work 
was more effective. Arguably, Canadian and British gunners silenced 
German guns on 21 October and 18 November since German artillery 
did not “retaliate strongly.”147 The gunners were becoming masters 
of their craft.
The Somme marked the beginning of a significant shift in British 
artillery doctrine and tactics. Staffs noted that inflexible fire plans—
necessarily so due to the abysmal communications and lengthy 
planning process—usually advanced too quickly and left the infantry 
to advance through German shellfire, barbed wire, and machine-
gun fire without fire support.148 Brooke noted that gunners “had still 
to learn that predicted artillery fire was possible, without previous 
registration, and that the main advantages to be derived from 
artillery fire was in its power of neutralising the hostile rifle, machine 
gun and artillery fire, as opposed to the destruction of trenches and 
obstacles.”149 In January 1929, Major-General A.G.L. McNaughton, 
former Canadian Corps Counter-Battery Staff Officer (27 January 
1917 – 10 November 1918), observed that during the Battle of the 
Somme:
There was not that happy combination in the employment of the 
artillery in support of the other arms which leads to easy success in 
battle…. Many of our battery officers and higher commanders were 
inexperienced; they could not be otherwise; our artillery intelligence 
was in its infancy; the methods of co-operation between aircraft and 
the military command was rudimentary; the type of shell was in many 
instances unsuitable for the task to be performed.150 
146  Artillery Instructions No. 32 by GOC RA, 24 September 1916, appended to WD 
GOC RA Canadian Corps, September 1916.
147  WD 4th Canadian Division, 21 October and 18 November 1916. 
148  Morton, When Your Number’s Up, 167. 
149  Alanbrooke, “Notes on My Life,” 57. 
150  Quoted in Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada, 274.
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Gunners noted that they could not destroy every defensive strongpoint 
and suggested that artillery fire “should be concentrated on the 
destruction of those parts which constitute the principal obstacles to 
the Infantry advance.”151 Following the Somme offensive, the artillery 
no longer sought to “destroy” the enemy’s defensive positions, which 
it had attempted to do throughout the battle. Rather, it sought 
to “neutralize” by suppressing the German machine guns and 
artillery. However, these lessons came at a high price. The Canadian 
Corps sustained 24,029 casualties fighting on the Somme between 
September and November 1916.152
The evolutions that improved the subsequent effectiveness of the 
British and Canadian artillery were many and varied. After 1916, 
the artillery changed its tactics and sought to “neutralize” German 
defences, rather than attempting to “destroy” them. The widespread 
use of the No. 106 Fuze on he shells facilitated wire cutting, while 
the use of gas and smoke shells made neutralizing German gun 
batteries possible without destroying the pieces or killing the crews. 
Accounting for weather, equipment, ammunition, and survey errors 
made predicted fire practical. Staffs became proficient at conducting 
appreciations and drafting orders with tight time constraints, and 
they also became adept at resupplying guns despite battlefield 
conditions. Improved communications made modifications to artillery 
programmes possible and ensured that fire could be brought to bear 
against the enemy where and when it was needed. Battle-hardened 
gunners and artillery officers, improved training and understanding of 
indirect fire procedures, and more focus on intelligence also contributed 
to the success of the Canadian Corps’ artillery in the battles of 1917 
and 1918. With a concerted effort applied to intelligence gathering, 
the necessary organizational apparatus provided by the cbso, and 
innovative technologies, the artillery acquired the ability to destroy 
or neutralize the majority of the German guns before the infantry 
began their attacks.
During the Battle of the Somme, the infantry depended on the 
guns to clear gaps in the barbed wire and knock out German defensive 
strongpoints. Otherwise, the infantry had to advance through uncut 
wire under withering machine-gun and artillery fire. In a number of 
engagements, the artillery managed to provide effective fire support. 
151  Artillery Lessons Drawn from the Battle of the Somme.
152  Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919, 198.
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However, the effectiveness of the Canadian artillery cooperation 
during the Battle of the Somme was far from uniform. The contrast 
between the Battle of Flers-Courcelette and the slugging match for 
Regina Trench clearly demonstrates that a number of factors impeded 
the performance of the artillery during the offensive, including 
insufficient time for the staff to plan and the artillery to prepare the 
battlefield, poor communications, deplorable conditions, inexperience, 
and unfamiliarity with indirect fire procedures. Commanders, staffs, 
and gunners learned from these battles during the Somme offensive, 
and they disseminated these lessons across the bef and applied them 
during subsequent battles in 1917 and 1918, when the artillery truly 
did “smash it all up.”
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